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ZK Proof of Assets

Circom & Groth16 SNARK implementation of Proof of Assets. This repo allows digital asset custodians (such as cryptocurrency exchanges) to prove that they own a certain amount of digital assets, without revealing the addresses that hold the assets. Proof of Assets is the first out of 2 protocols that make up a Proof of Reserves protocol; the other protocol is Proof of Liabilities (repo here).

  1. For details on the whole PoR project see this project doc.
  2. For the original Proof of Assets design doc see this. Note, however, that the final design is slightly different to the original (some optimizations were done). See below for final design.
  3. For an in-depth explanation of Proof of Assets see this article.

Brief overview of PoA

The above-linked docs offer an in-depth explanation, but here is a brief one:

Problem statement: a crypto-asset custodian wants to prove they own $X$ digital assets, but do not want to reveal the addresses that hold the assets.

Solution: the custodian produces signatures for the addresses (which forms the ownership proof), and feeds them as private inputs to a ZK-SNARK, which verifies them and checks that they are contained within a larger set of addresses (the anonymity set). This set is a public input to the snark and must be checked to mirror the blockchain by the verifier.

The main purpose of PoA is to link with PoL to produce a proof that $\sum \text{liabilities} \le \sum \text{assets}$. In this case the custodian can hide their asset sum $X$ and just produce a proof that the solvency equation holds. The output of the PoA snark is thus a Pedersen commitment to $X$, as opposed to the raw value.

Current state

No audit has been done yet

The code is working as of June 2024 and can be used as is. It only works for EVM blockchains, but it is possible to support other chains.

See the high priority task list for some important outstanding issues.

The code is at it's first stage: Groth16 & Circom libraries. Second stage involves using different proving systems & libraries for ECDSA verification to gain [hopefully] ~1000x in performance. Track progress here: #23

Design

Overview

Prover:

  • select anonymity set, making sure that all owned addresses are contained in it
  • publish anonymity set
  • produce signatures for owned addresses
  • produce snark proof, using signatures as private input and anonymity set as public input

Verifier:

  • check that anonymity set matches on-chain data
  • verify snark proof

Detailed

The motivation for the following design can be found in the above-linked design doc

There is a system of snarks, separated into 3 layers and linked via snark recursion. The was done to increase the total number of signatures that can be supported. The max number of signatures is determined by the max number of R1CS constraints for a Groth16 snark, which depends on publicly available Powers of Tau files. Note that signature verification is the most expensive operation (read more here).

The layers each have the following responsibilities:

  • Layer 1: verify signatures (many snarks in parallel)
  • Layer 2: verify public keys are associated with an address in the anonymity set (many snarks in parallel)
  • Layer 3: sum up balances & produce Pedersen commitment

Verifying a snark inside a snark is rather expensive (~20M constraints) and the cost increases dramatically if the public inputs are large (read more here). To keep the public inputs small, we hash public values.

The anonymity set is much too large to feed into the snark as a public input, so we rather create a Merkle tree from the set (outside the snark) and use Merkle inclusion proofs (private inputs) and the root hash (public input) as inputs to the snark system. The Poseidon hash function was chosen because of it's snark-compatibility (read more here).

The Pedersen commitment is done with the Ristretto Group for the Edwards form of Curve25519 (read more here).

Diagram showing recursive snark design for ECDSA signatures

Key:

  • $N$ - total number of signatures
  • $k$ - number of batches
  • $n'$ - batch size, where $kn' = N$
  • $\sigma = (\sigma_{\text{pubkey}}, \sigma_r, \sigma_{r'}, \sigma_s, \sigma_{\text{message}})$ - ECDSA* signature (note that $r'$ is an extension of the original ECDSA signature, and can be calculated from the other signature values)
  • $x$ - number of field values in a snark proof
  • $h$ - height of the merkle tree

Flow diagram

Prover

The prover $\mathcal{P}$ needs to produce the following:

  • A set of owned addresses & balances: $A=\{(a,b) : a \text{ is an address owned by P and } b \text{ is it's balance}\}$
  • ECDSA* signatures for all owned addresses: $S=\{\sigma=(\sigma_{\text{public key}}, \sigma_r, \sigma_{r'}, \sigma_s, \sigma_{\text{message}}) : (a,b) \in A, a = \text{address\_from\_pubkey}(\sigma_{\text{public key}})\}$
  • A set of addresses & balances from the Ethereum blockchain: $A^*=\{(a,b) : a \text{ is an address and } b \text{ is it's balance}\}$. The addresses corresponding to sigs in $S$ must be contained in $A^*$.
  • A Merkle tree for $A^* $: $M=\text{merkle\_tree}(A^*)$
  • Merkle proofs for $A$: $M_{\text{proofs}}=\{\text{merkle\_proof}(a,M) : a \in A\}$
  • Pedersen commitment to the balance sum of $A$: $P=g^{\sum_{b \in A} b} h^r$ where $g$ & $h$ are generators and $r$ is the blinding factor

The prover then runs the snark system on these inputs to produce a proof $\pi$, and publishes the following: $\pi$, $A^* $, $P$.

Verifier

The verifier does the following:

  • Construct the root hash of the Merkle tree using $A^*$: $M_{\text{root}}$
  • Verify the proof $\pi$ using $(M_{\text{root}},P)$

Security

See this list of issues, and this.

Usage

Prover

The code has only been tested on a Linux machine (Debian).

First, you'll need to install some software. There is a script that does all of this for you: machine_initialization.sh. The script only works on a Debian machine. It does some invasive changes to the machine (like changing vm.max_map_count in sysctl) so it is recommended to run it on a server and not your personal machine; running it in a Docker container is also an option. You can find out more about what this script does here.

Next, you run the full workflow script, which will run the entire snark proving system. The anonymity set and signature set will have to be given as input to the script, so these need to be generated first. You can read more about the script and it's inputs here.

Here are some useful commands to copy:

# Run a docker container:
id=$(docker run --privileged -d -ti -m 100G --memory-swap -1 --name poa_100g --rm ubuntu /bin/bash)
# - `-m` : set max memory (-1 for unlimited), which can be useful if you want to use the machine for other tasks, and you know the zk workflow will take up all the memory
# - `--memory-swap` : max swap (-1 for unlimited)
# - `--privileged` : is needed to change vm.max_map_count (see machine_initialization.sh script)

# Copy over the init script to the container:
wget https://raw.githubusercontent.com/silversixpence-crypto/zk-proof-of-assets/main/scripts/machine_initialization.sh
docker cp ./machine_initialization.sh $id:/home

docker attach $id

# =====================================
# Now in container..

# Make sure the system is up to date:
apt update -y && apt upgrade -y && apt install -y sudo vim

# Run the init script:
cd /home && ./machine_initialization.sh -r /root -P -S

# Run the proving system:
cd /root/zk-proof-of-assets
./full_workflow.sh \
    $signatures_file \
    $anon_set_file \
    $blinding_factor

Powers of Tau

The ptau files can be manually downloaded from the snarkjs GH, but are also automatically downloaded by the machine_initialization script. These files are used as a 'safe' source of randomness for the proving key generation phase (read more here).

Anonymity set

The anonymity set must be created by the prover, and then made public. One way to create this set is to take the top N accounts of a blockchain (ranked by holdings of the digital asset).

Here is a list of datasets for various blockchains. This is how to use the BigQuery dataset for Ethereum to get an anonymity set size of the top 10M Ethereum addresses (ranked by ETH held):

  1. Select "VIEW DATASET"
  2. Under the crypto_ethereum tab you will find the balances table, where you can use this SQL query to get the top 10M addresses:
SELECT * FROM `bigquery-public-data.crypto_ethereum.balances` ORDER BY eth_balance DESC LIMIT 10000000
  1. 10M winds up being ~600MB, which you can add to your Drive (without paid API access) and then download.

Verifier

Script still needs to be written: #60

Verification can be done with the snarkjs tool:

snarkjs groth16 verify ./path/to/vkey.json ./path/to/public_inputs.json ./path/to/proof.json

All 3 of the inputs to the script need to be provided by the prover.

Patches

The init script applies a few patches to the submodules.

Workaround for a problem in the circom compiler: iden3/circom#230

There are conflicts with function names between ed25519-circom and other dependencies, so the patch renames the functions.

Performance

Most of the time taken up by the workflow is in generating the proving keys (zkeys). These can take hours, days or weeks to generate, depending on the memory capacity of the machine & the size of the input to the workflow. The good thing is that, once the keys are generated, they can be reused. So, one only needs to generate them once, and then they can be used for any number of proofs going forward (as long as the size of the inputs stay the same).

Constraints

For layer 1, the number of non-linear constraints can be estimated with the following equation: $$C_{\text{layer 1}}(s) = 447044s + 888502$$ where $s$ is the number of signatures. This equation was calculated using a line of best fit from the test data:

# (num_sigs, constraints)
 [(1,        1509221),
  (2,        1932908),
  (2,        1932908),
  (4,        1932908),
  (7,        4161827),
  (16,       8173925),
  (128,      58102853)]

For layer 2, the number of non-linear constraints can be estimated with the following equation: $$C_{\text{layer 2}}(s,h) = 159591s + 6054h + 19490640$$ where $h$ is the height of the Merkle tree. Note that the main source of constraints in the layer 2 circuit comes from Groth16 verification. This equation was calculated using a line of best fit from the test data:

# (num_sigs, height, constraints)
 [(4,        12,     19981480),
  (1,        5,      19823616),
  (2,        25,     19987876),
  (7,        25,     20784765),
  (16,       25,     22219209),
  (128,      25,     40070665)]

Testing

Related issue: #22

There are scripts in the tests directory for running the tests. The have the format N_sigs_K_batches_H_height.sh. The tests can take many hours to run, depending on the test & the size of the machine running them. The results from running the tests can be found in the directory under tests with the same name as the shell script. The tests/old directory contains tests that were run using a slightly older version of the workflow (same circuits, different scripts).

There are only integration tests, no unit tests. The reason for this is that the whole system might change in the next version, so writing lots of unit tests is a bit of a waste of time. The unit tests would be there to catch any bugs introduced with future changes, but if there are to be no future changes to the current system then the unit tests are a waste. We already have integration tests to make sure that no bugs are present with the current workflow.